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In the 1970s and 1980s a number of observers argued that the United States had entered 
a phase of irreversible decline, in which its economy would not only be overtaken by 
Japan’s,2 but would prove incapable of underwriting its strategic ambitions.3 Yet, by the 
end of the 1990s, following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the seemingly terminal 
demise of socialism as an alternative to capitalism, to say nothing of the East Asian 
financial crisis and the remarkable renaissance of the US economy, pessimism was 
replaced by triumphalism,4 and expectations about the rise of Asia were eclipsed by 
visions of a new American century.  American observers and strategists routinely talked 
of a new ‘unipolar moment’ in which American power was set to enjoy an unrivalled 
and enduring position of dominance at the heart of a broadly supported, stable 
international order.5 The new millennium, however, has witnessed yet another re-
assessment of America’s position. 
 
The events of September 11th provided a dramatic illustration of the limits of US 
hegemony and encouraged a more general re-assessment of America’s position in the 
post-Cold War world. It was clear that for all America’s seemingly unchallengeable 
                                                           
1 We would like to thank Alex Bellamy and this journal’s anonymous reviewers for 
commenting on an earlier version of this paper. The usual caveats apply.  
2 Ezra F. Vogel Japan As Number One: Lessons for America, (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press 1979).  
3 Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of Great Powers: Economic Change and Military 
Conflict From 1500 to 2000 (New York: Vintage, 1989). 
4 Zuckerman, M B ‘A second American century’, Foreign Affairs, 77, 3 (1998), pp 
18-31 
5 William Wohlforth, ‘The stability of a unipolar world’, International Security, 24, 1 
(1999), pp 5-41. 
 2
military, economic political, and even cultural pre-eminence, it was incapable of 
protecting the American mainland from opponents of the international order it had 
helped create. At the same time as major questions about the appropriateness and 
viability of America’s contemporary security policies were emerging,6 another major 
pillar of America’s resurgent post-Cold War position – its domestic economy – was 
about to suffer a major reversal of fortune.  
 
The hyperbole that accompanied the emergence of the so-called ‘new economy’ rapidly 
gave way to more sober assessments of America’s economic prospects. The confidence 
of American and foreign investors in the American economy had already been 
undermined by the collapse of the Nasdaq high technology market; a series of 
associated corporate collapses at Enron and WorldCom, coupled with allegations of 
corruption and regulatory failure, prompted a broader reassessment of America’s 
economic performance. Indeed, if it had been an East Asian economy, America’s debt 
burden, re-emerging budget deficits, and reliance on foreign capital, might already have 
seen it subjected to far more unfavourable market judgements and the attentions of 
external agencies like the International Monetary Fund (IMF). It is testimony to the 
enduring power of both the American economy, and the influence the US is able to 
exert over the transnational institutions that have assumed such a prominent role in the 
management of an increasingly integrated international economy that it has remained 
relatively immune to such forces thus far.  
 
Despite its present problems the US plays a pivotal role in the contemporary 
international system and is able to shape that system to reflect its own interests in a way 
that is similar to, but distinct from earlier hegemonic powers such as Imperial Britain. 
At a time when the contemporary international order is in a period of flux, and when 
the position of the US itself is subject to a range of internal pressures and external 
challenges, it is useful to try and gauge both the character of, and limits to, US 
hegemony. We shall examine the dynamics of US power in the context of East Asia, 
which according to some observers of US foreign policy and international affairs, at 
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least, is the region that is most likely to generate a challenge to US hegemony in the 
coming century.7 
 
The first part of the paper considers the concept of hegemony. We argue that despite 
the differing ways the idea of hegemony has been utilised, the concept provides a very 
useful way of understanding US power and its relationship with regions like East Asia. 
Following this, we place America’s relationship with East Asia in historical context, 
before considering its current relationships with China, Japan and the region as a whole. 
The central argument we advance is that the character of US hegemony is changing and 
this is closely connected to the wider transformation of the nation-state system. While 
this places limits on US hegemony, it also makes it far less likely that the sorts of 
challenges to US hegemony postulated by some scholars will actually occur in the way 
they envisage, if they occur at all. What an examination of relations with East Asia 
reveals is that US hegemony has become more diffuse in the post-Cold War era. While 
American hegemony remains a fundamentally important component of the 
contemporary system, it has become increasingly  decentred, bound-up with processes 
of globalisation, and imbricated in the continuing and uneven reconfiguration of the 
nation-state system. 
 
Theories of Hegemony 
 
The use of the concept of hegemony to understand political and social phenomena is 
generally traced to the work of the early twentieth century Italian Marxist, Antonio 
Gramsci. However, it now routinely employed by a range of diverse observers to 
describe America’s place in the contemporary international order; when even The 
Economist describes the US as hegemonic, it is clearly become a relatively 
uncontroversial way of characterizing American power in the post-Cold War world.8 
Yet such divergent perspectives highlight the contested conceptual status of notion of 
hegemony, and the different ways in which Gramscians, liberals, realists and even 
Marxist theorists of international relations have employed it. To understand the 
complex and changing status of hegemony, therefore, and as a precursor to analysing 
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hegemony in East Asia, we need to distinguish more carefully between its various 
usages. 
 
The popularisation of the idea of hegemony in mainstream North American scholarship 
began with Charles Kindleberger’s influential explanation of the Great Depression.9 For 
Kindleberger, the economic collapse that marked the inter-war period could be 
explained by the absence of a hegemonic power willing to play the role of systemic 
stabiliser, providing key public goods to keep an ‘open’ international economic system 
functioning. The demise of British hegemony and the failure of the US to assume this 
role meant that countries rejected cooperation in favour of an unsustainable, mutually 
destructive autarchy, ultimately leading to a major – almost terminal - crisis of 
capitalism. The major lesson of this period as far as Kindleberger was concerned was 
that hegemony – especially the sort of liberal hegemony the US is associated with – 
was a good thing as it ensured a cooperative international order that was less prone to 
crisis and more stable. This basic orientation provided the rationale for the creation of a 
new post-war order that was explicitly designed to avoid the ‘mistakes’ of the inter-war 
period. 
 
Although a detailed consideration of the emergence of this new regime is beyond the 
scope of this paper,10 a few brief comments are necessary. First, the post-war order and 
the development of the new Bretton Woods institutions – the World Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade – 
primarily reflected the views of America, the newly ascendant hegemonic power. The 
new regime was intended, first and foremost, to encourage the development or 
reconstruction of successful capitalist economies in opposition to what then appeared to 
be a formidable ideological opponent. Second, the creation of these institutions was an 
acknowledgement of the need for transnational mechanisms with which to mange an 
increasingly integrated international system. Importantly, and despite the US’s 
normative preference for an open and liberal international order, the new institutions 
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were part of a highly regulated regime predicated upon a notion of ‘embedded 
liberalism’ that allowed a good deal of national economic autonomy.11 
 
In liberal understandings of both the theory and practice of hegemony, therefore, US 
hegemony is associated with the creation of a complex, interlocking institutional order 
that coordinates collaborative inter-state activities in mutually rewarding ways by 
reducing transaction costs and increasing certainty.12 Although there is plainly a set of 
normative assumptions about the preferability of such an US-centric international order, 
John Ikenberry has persuasively argued that at least the Western states that compose 
this order are bound to American hegemony by its ‘constitutional characteristics’. 
Because America is constrained in the exercise of its overweening power by the very 
institutions it has helped create, because other counties derive benefits from an open 
international order, and because it is difficult to develop alternatives given sunk costs 
and path dependency, Ikenberry argues, other nation-states - including potential 
challengers to US hegemony – are effectively locked into the prevailing order.13 
 
The essentially benign view of the contemporary international system outlined by 
Ikenberry and others is rejected by realists. The inherently conflictual assumptions 
realists make about the world are widely known and remain influential. Arguably, the 
most significant realist interpretation of hegemony has come from Robert Gilpin. For 
Gilpin, the essential contradiction of hegemony in general, and of America’s liberal 
hegemony in particular, is that it sows the seeds of its own downfall by creating the 
circumstances in which future rivals can prosper and grow.14 This zero-sum view of the 
world, in which one state’s gain is another’s loss, is a fundamental part of the realist 
view, and one which underpins its claims about the supposed universality of state 
behaviour. As a consequence of this sort of logic, John Mearsheimer argues, contra the 
liberal view, that not only do all states want to be hegemonic and dominate the 
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international system, but they have no interest in preserving the status quo until they 
do.15  For Mearsheimer, realist logic leads him to conclude that the US has a ‘profound 
interest in seeing Chinese economic growth slow in the years ahead’.16 As we shall see 
in more detail later, both realist and liberal perspectives have shaped debates about how 
best to deal with potential challengers to US hegemony. 
 
Theories of hegemony that derive their inspiration from radical or Marxist 
understandings of the world, while sharing some of realism’s assumptions about the 
conflictual character of international relations specifically and the world generally, 
reject both the state-centric focus of realism and what they would see as the ideological 
bias of liberalism. Indeed, when Robert Cox reintroduced Gramsci’s ideas about 
hegemony to a wider audience in the early 1980s, he famously observed that ‘theory is 
always for someone and for some purpose’.17 In other words, liberal and realist theories 
of hegemony are not just claims about how the world is ordered, but about how it 
should be ordered. By contrast, in Gramscian-inspired formulations, specific, 
historically conditioned configurations of power and interest are shaped by the 
dialectical interaction of material capabilities, institutions and ideas. In this context, 
hegemony refers not simply to the dominance of a particular state but to the dominance 
of a particular (capitalist) class and its ability to ‘create an order based ideologically on 
a broad measure of consent, functioning according to general principles that in fact 
ensure the continuing supremacy of the leading state or states and leading social classes 
but at the same time offer some measure or prospect of satisfaction to the less 
powerful’.18 There are striking echoes of Ikenberry’s liberal conception here, with the 
noteworthy caveat that for Cox the development of institutions associated with Bretton 
Woods is evidence of the dialectically-determined emergence of a global class structure 
that attempts to shape the world to reflect its own interests rather than some notion of 
the collective good.  
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The key point to emphasise at this stage is that the end of the Cold War and the demise 
of socialism, combined with the increased integration of international economic 
activity, has transformed the context within which inter-state relations and the operation 
of any form of hegemony unfold, making the relationships between wealth, power and 
territorially-demarcated space less certain, and giving a much greater prominence to 
economic rather than military competition.19 Consequently, one of the most important 
contests of the last couple of decades, has neither been military, nor even an overtly 
class-based struggle about the fate of capitalism; rather it has been an intellectual 
debate about the precise form capitalism should take, and the structures that should 
govern it in an increasingly pervasive international economic order.20  
 
It is at this point that the possible contradictions of, and limits to, US hegemony begin 
to become apparent. Certainly, the US clearly enjoys a greater degree of what Susan 
Strange called ‘structural power’ than any other state.21 Whether it is measured by 
military dominance, control of the production and credit systems, or by its presence in 
key leading-edge knowledge industries that are central components of America’s 
economic and strategic dominance, the US clearly remains unrivalled. And yet, there 
are plainly limits to its influence. Although what has been described as ‘governance 
without government’,22 in which a range of actors other than states play a part is 
managing the international system, is emblematic of the new order the US has helped 
create, it inevitably places some constraints on American autonomy. More 
fundamentally, in an international system characterised by increasingly extensive, 
multi-dimensional, cross-border interdependencies in which the boundaries and the 
analytical utility of ‘national economies’ are not as obvious as they once were, then the 
very idea of a coherent and pursuable ‘national interest’ is problematic.23  
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Although the present international system plainly retains important elements of earlier 
world orders, it continues to change in ways that set contemporary U.S. hegemony in 
the post-Cold War era apart from the structures and sinews that bolstered the Great 
Powers in an earlier era.24 Consequently, we argue that if we want to understand the 
way that US hegemony operates we need to be conscious of the changing character of 
the wider international order in which it is embedded,25 the impact this has on 
historically contingent constellations of class forces, and the potential influence it may 
have on the state itself, as it, too, is re-shaped by transnational forces that may 
determine the way national interests are conceived and constrain the way they are 
pursued. The changing character of hegemony generally and US power in particular can 
best be understood, therefore, by placing it in a specific historical context and 
considering alternative hegemonic powers. Consequently, we initially sketch US 
interaction with East Asia before moving on to consider the prospects for Chinese, 
Japanese and regionally based responses to US hegemony.  
 
US Hegemony and the Cold War in East Asia 
 
At the centre of U.S. hegemony in the Cold War era was an array of agencies and 
departments that made up the U.S. national security state,26 dedicated to containing the 
Soviet Union specifically, and international communism more generally. This goal was 
closely connected to the maintenance and expansion of North American access to 
markets, investment opportunities and raw materials. In this context the U.S. had a 
crucial stake in the capitalist reconstruction of Europe and Asia in particular. By the 
end of the 1940s the US had embarked on a full-scale effort to facilitate the industrial 
rebirth of Japan, as part of what would become a wider effort to turn as much of 
Northeast Asia (and later Southeast Asia) as possible into a capitalist bulwark against 
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the Soviet Union and Mao’s China.27 With the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) 
victory in October 1949 and the onset of the Korean War (1950-1953), the 
governmental and military institutions and bureaucratic structures of the U.S. national 
security state were increasingly consolidated as instruments of regional and global 
power.28 The rise of the Chinese Communist Party and the Korean War were viewed by 
the U.S., and the European colonial governments seeking to regain or retain their 
possessions in Southeast Asia, as emblematic of a vigorous international communist 
movement that operated as a monolithic force under the direction of Moscow and 
Beijing and which was about to spread to Southeast Asia.29 From the point of view of 
policy-makers in Washington, the emerging nation-states of Asia were interchangeable 
pieces on the chessboard of Cold War geo-politics and the major concern was with their 
stability and their role in the wider effort to contain communism.  
 
America’s initial involvement in Vietnam was emblematic of a wider orientation to the 
region. The U.S. build up in South Vietnam generated important economic benefits for 
Washington’s allies in Asia. In the same way that the Korean War represented an 
important turning point for Japan’s post-war economic take-off, the Vietnam War was a 
crucial stimulus for South Korea and Taiwan, which benefited from extensive 
American aid and investment. For Japan, the Vietnam War was also economically 
beneficial, pulling Japanese industry out of a slump it had entered in 1965. The 
deepening of the war in Southeast Asia lifted profits for major Japanese companies by 
more than USD$ 1 billion annually between 1966 and 1971. It also directed funds to a 
number of crucial ‘infant export industries’ and facilitated increased access to both 
North America and Southeast Asian markets for Japanese manufactures.30 Indeed, the 
successful reconstruction of the Japanese economy was the cornerstone of a more 
generalised process of economic development across the region that characterized the 
‘miracle’ years of the 1970s and 1980s in Japan and the 1980s and 1990s for the region 
more generally. 
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By the end of the 1960s, meanwhile, there was a massive U.S. presence in Vietnam and 
Southeast Asia. Despite this, U.S. hegemony in Southeast Asia and beyond was uneven 
and contradictory. On the one hand, America was increasingly constrained by the limits 
imposed by its efforts to build a stable and modern South Vietnam.31 Not only was 
America ultimately unable to sustain domestic support for a deeply unpopular war, but 
the war’s impact on the US budget and trade position meant that it would ultimately be 
forced to abandon the Bretton Woods-inspired system of fixed exchange rates, paving 
the way for a fundamental and far-reaching transformation of the international 
economic system.32  Even in a narrower diplomatic context, the limits of U.S. 
hegemony in the region were apparent in Washington’s inability to gain or retain more 
widespread multilateral support for its involvement in Vietnam. And yet, despite the 
evident limits to US power, one of the most lasting consequences of the Washington’s 
strategic engagement with the region was a network of essentially bilateral security 
alliances across the region that had the effect of inhibiting intra-regional development 
and cooperation for many years.33 Paradoxically, therefore, and despite the US’s 
military defeat and associated domestic financial and social trauma, its place at the 
centre of the region’s overall security architecture was ultimately consolidated and the 
ability of rivals to challenge its position was constrained. 
 
The Vietnam War and the crisis of US hegemony in Asia was central to the wider geo-
political and geo-economic policies of the Nixon administration (1969-1974), which 
unintentionally laid the foundations for what would become the U.S.-led globalisation 
project by the 1980s. At the beginning of 1969, Nixon outlined what became known as 
the Nixon Doctrine, which redefined the  US role in Asia and was primarily aimed at 
avoiding direct military intervention.34 In the 1970s Washington sought to manage the 
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numerous reformist and revolutionary challenges to U.S. hegemony, via increased 
reliance on covert activities, military aid and unquestioning support for authoritarian 
regimes. The Nixon Doctrine was explicitly aimed at avoiding another Vietnam; 
however, it did little to alter a deeply rooted Cold War outlook that was preoccupied 
with the ongoing rivalry between the US and the Soviet Union. Central to 
Washington’s geo-political shifts and continuities in the 1970s were US overtures to 
China.35 
 
By the time of Washington’s strategic reo-orientation in the 1970s, the U.S. had been 
eclipsed by Japan as Asia’s most significant source of foreign aid and investment. 
Between the 1940s and the 1970s, the Japanese government and Japan-based 
corporations had - with U.S. sponsorship -gradually re-built their linkages with 
Northeast and Southeast Asia.36 By the first half of the 1970s, four times as much 
foreign direct investment (FDI) was going to South Korea from Japan as from the 
United States. In the second half of the 1980s, the amount of Japanese FDI spreading 
around the region underwent a further dramatic increase. The ratification of the Plaza 
Accord in 1985 encouraged a growing number of Japanese corporations to move their 
operations offshore, leading to major new investments in first Taiwan and South Korea, 
and subsequently Southeast Asia.37  This geographical restructuring of the world 
economy was linked to the general rise of the U.S.-led globalisation project,38 and to 
the simultaneous, but contradictory trend towards selective industrial protectionism in 
the 1980s. Protectionism was intended to curb Japanese exports into the markets of 
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North America and Western Europe but it consolidated the economic and political ties 
between various nation-states of Asia and Japan as the latter established export 
platforms across the region.39 
 
By the 1980s China had also become a major focus of economic activity as it emerged 
as the new workshop of the Asia-Pacific. The earlier improvement in US-Chinese 
relations had increasingly coincided with important changes to the developmental 
orientation of the CCP-state. The passing of Mao from the Chinese political stage in 
1976, and the growing awareness of the economic shortcomings associated with the 
early Soviet model and the post-1960 economic policies that culminated in the Cultural 
Revolution, paved the way for the rise of Deng Xiaoping. After 1978 the country’s 
central planning system was gradually wound back in favour of market mechanisms. 
China’s return to capitalism in the late 1970s was a victory, of sorts, in the Cold War in 
Asia, insofar as this shift marked an implicit acknowledgment of the relative success of 
capitalism generally, and of the post-war capitalist dynamism of Japan, South Korea 
and Taiwan more particularly.40 The victory, however, was ambiguous: not only did 
China’s rediscovery of capitalism do little to change Washington’s assessment of China 
as a major threat, but its apparently successful embrace of capitalism threatened to 
provide the wherewithal for China to mount a serious challenge to America’s regional 
hegemony. 
 
China: Rising Hegemon? 
 
The end of the Cold War and China’s integration into the capitalist world economy 
notwithstanding, attitudes toward China amongst many US policy makers became 
increasingly negative in the 1990s.41 Superficially this concern makes sense: China’s 
sheer size, lingering resentment about one hundred years of humiliation at the hands of 
the European imperial powers and Japan, and dissatisfaction with the prevailing 
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international order, suggest that it will have both the capacity and the desire to 
challenge US dominance. As far as realists like Mearsheimer are concerned, China’s 
economic development means that it ‘might be far more powerful and dangerous than 
any potential hegemons that the United States faced in the twentieth century’.42  
From this point of view, Chinese power must be contained and its overall development 
discouraged.  
 
Despite the fact that China’s own foreign policy generally and attitudes to the US in 
particular reflect some decidedly realist assumptions and aspirations,43 we argue that a 
response predicated on an attempt to contain China is fundamentally misconceived and 
displays little awareness of the changing, multi-dimensional character of US hegemony 
and the context within which it operates. Even at the level of brute military power, 
which remains the principal concern of realists, China is hardly a serious threat to the 
US. In 2003, the US will spend more on defence than the next 15-20 biggest spenders 
combined – and the spending and technological gap between the US and China will 
continue to grow. Most significantly of all, America’s overwhelming military 
dominance is achieved with only 3.5 per cent of GDP. As Brooks and Wohlforth point 
out, the US can afford to engage rather than confront China certain in the knowledge 
that, even should such a strategy prove misguided, it can easily resort to a realist 
response through increased defence spending.44  By contrast, and despite all the 
hyperbole about China’s growth prospects, China remains a middle ranking power with 
little capacity to threaten America economically or militarily.45  
 
Liberals argue that China’s elites can be socialised into ‘good’ behaviour. Thus, in their 
view its domestic and foreign policies can increasingly be shaped by the US and its 
allies, by and international organizations more generally.46 Given the continuing 
importance of nationalist sentiment in China, and the preference China’s elites have for 
bilateral rather than multilateral relations, this might seem an overly optimistic, not to 
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say naïve hope. And yet, China has begun to embrace multilateral diplomacy47 – albeit 
to counter rather than complement American influence - and some of China’s most 
important institutions are being reconfigured by its integration into the wider global 
economy. The reform process unleashed by Deng Xiaoping in 1978 may have been 
primarily intended to bolster the standing of the Chinese Communist Party,48 but it has 
had the paradoxical, if predictable, effect of transforming and problematising China’s 
domestic social relations. Not only are capitalists now allowed to join the Party, the 
status of communism itself in an increasingly capitalist-oriented country is a subject of 
open debate.49 The reality of increased integration with and dependence on American 
economic interests is fundamentally reconfiguring and constraining policy in China.50 
In the longer-term, an even more telling manifestation of the new order that is 
transforming China is its accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO).  
 
The WTO is both a key mechanism for the promotion of a particularly Anglo-American 
form of capitalism, and emblematic of the new international order in which inter-
governmental organisations play such a pivotal part. While the US’s influence over the 
WTO’s agenda may not be quite as obvious as it is on the IMF’s, it doesn’t need to be: 
the WTO exemplifies the sort of decentred hegemony that is central to the expansion 
and consolidation of global capitalism.51 The thorough-going nature and extent of this 
influence is plainly visible in the nature of the legal reforms China’s government will 
have to undertake to ensure compliance with WTO rules – up to and including changes 
to the PRC Constitution.52  Consequently, China’s accession to the WTO is of 
fundamental importance for a number of reasons. First, China is voluntarily joining an 
‘independent’ organisation that is dominated by the major capitalist powers; it is 
difficult to exaggerate the long-term historical significance of the PRC – a nominally 
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communist nation-state and the last major alternative to a ubiquitous capitalist order - 
willingly acceding to the WTO’s conditions of entry which are ‘more far-reaching than 
those set for any other member’.53  Second, the legally binding nature of the WTO 
regime has the potential to permanently ‘lock in’ specific reforms that are designed to 
privilege the interests of private capital in ways that will necessarily over-turn existent 
social relations within China.54  
 
Although the Chinese government is showing signs of trying to fudge some of the 
required reforms,55 the long-term significance of embracing the new regulatory regime 
is becoming increasingly clear. What Stephen Gill describes as the ‘new 
constitutionalism’ is a legally enshrined order that is designed to ‘provide political 
anchorage for the power of capital in the long term’.56 In the context of possible 
hegemonic rivalry, the real significance of the inter-action between the ‘the US’ and 
‘China’ is not at the level of great power military confrontation, nor even primarily at 
the level of inter-state diplomacy. On the contrary, the transformation that is occurring 
in China is a consequence of the sort of complex dialectical interaction described by 
Cox, which involves major structural change in the organization of China’s economy at 
both the domestic and international level, the increasingly pervasive influence of 
intergovernmental agencies like the WTO, and the gradual adoption of a new, globally 
oriented ideational framework that is ultimately embedded in law.57 In such 
circumstances the impact of distinctively American hegemony is but one part of a wider 
transnational process.  
 
While China’s star may be in the ascendant, it poses little threat to the US: it lacks the 
capacity to directly threaten the US, in the way realists might expect; it has little of the 
‘soft power’ influential commentators such as Nye take to be such a central component 
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of US power;58 and it is being steadily transformed economically, politically and 
ideationally by the uneven but dynamic spread of global capitalism. The Chinese 
trajectory reflects both the historical specificity of nation-state formation and the wider 
problems of the nation-state in the late twentieth century in the context of a changing 
global order centred on US hegemony.59 Contemporary China is characterized by a 
crisis of state-mediated national development that not only involves national 
reorientation, but also encompasses increasing conflict over the ethnic or religious 
content and/or territorial boundaries (at the margins rather than the centre) of the nation 
itself. At this juncture national fragmentation and a full-scale crisis of the nation-state 
in China is not imminent. However, the Chinese leadership’s pursuit of national 
development and/or regional hegemony (and the efforts of an increasingly geriatric 
Communist Party to retain a monopoly on political power) continues to be profoundly 
constrained by looming political, social, environmental and economic crises grounded 
in rapid and uneven capitalist development and characterized by increasingly stark 
divisions between the booming coastal regions and the impoverished interior. This is 
not to mention restive regions such as Tibet and Xinjiang and the complicated issue of 
the future of Taiwan all set against the backdrop of the Chinese state’s domestication 




The other possible East Asian candidate for regional or even global hegemony is, of 
course, Japan. Following its crushing defeat at the hands of the US during World War 
II, Japan amazed many observers by rising to become the world’s second largest 
economy with historically unprecedented rapidity. Then, at the height of its success, it 
fell into an economic slump that its politicians and recently discredited bureaucrats 
seem unable to escape.61 Its current economic malaise notwithstanding, however, Japan 
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remains the world’s second largest economy and those variants of hegemonic theory 
that emphasise the cyclical nature of hegemony and the importance of economic power 
would suggest that Japan ought to be more assertively challenging American 
dominance.62 And yet for all Japan’s undoubted economic strength it has not enjoyed, 
or attempted to develop, a concomitant political influence either regionally or globally. 
Unravelling this paradox tells us much about the nature of both Japanese and American 
power. 
 
As noted earlier, the Cold War framework erected in Asia by the United States 
provided the context within which Japan’s state-led, mercantilist capitalism flourished. 
Significantly, during its occupation of Japan, America was unable to overturn the 
bureaucratic structures and political relationships that would prove integral components 
of the ‘developmental state’.63 But if there were limits to the US’s capacity to transform 
Japan’s political class, its support of Japan’s economic reconstruction was remarkably 
successful. Japan’s domestic economic renaissance and subsequent expansion into 
Southeast Asia directly benefited from America’s military engagements in East Asia.64 
Three points are worth emphasising about the relationship that developed between 
Japan and America in the aftermath of World War II as they help us to understand the 
nature and limits of contemporary hegemony. 
 
First, Japan’s repudiation of militarism has seen the emergence of a new kind of 
‘trading state’,65 one that concentrates national resources primarily on economic 
development. Significantly, as Heginbotham and Samuels point out, ‘whereas Japan 
once pursued policies designed to strengthen its economic base for the purposes of 
enhancing its military power, today the concepts of security and power frequently are 
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defined in technological, industrial, and economic terms’.66 Thus, Japan’s 
developmental strategy has been fundamentally at odds with the expectations of 
realists: not only has Japan continued to maintain a relatively low international profile 
diplomatically, but it has relied heavily on the US to underwrite its own security 
position, despite its own growing economic strength and obvious capacity become a 
major military power. 
 
The second point to make about Japan and its place in the international system, which 
flows from its emphasis on economic development, is that this has not stopped Japan 
from becoming a major power. Despite both its frequently noted inability to play a 
decisive international role and its continuing subordination to the US,67 Japan’s sheer 
economic weight and coordinated approach to economic expansion overseas means that 
it exercises a form of ‘quasi-hegemony’, especially in Southeast Asia.68 Through a 
complex array of trade, aid and investment packages, Japanese corporations, working in 
collaboration with key government ministries, have consolidated production networks 
that enhance Japan’s overall structural power in the region. Although Japanese power is 
not as multi-faceted as America’s, it exerts a major influence - both as a role model and 
as a more direct source of foreign investment - over the economies of the region.69 
Indeed, Japan’s economic dominance of Southeast Asia in particular has made it 
difficult for American corporations to establish themselves in the region.70 Revealingly, 
however, changes in production processes and strategies,71 combined with America’s 
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technological resurgence and emerging doubts about Japan’s own state-led 
development model,72 have begun to erode Japan’s position.  
 
The Japanese experience is significant in illustrating the changing character of 
hegemony for a third reason.  Not only is Japan’s quasi-hegemony not centred 
primarily on ‘Japan’, or even the Japanese state, but its contradictory character also 
places constraints on both Japanese and American policymakers. In Japan’s case the 
legacy of the developmental state and the sorts of strategies that underpinned Japan’s 
earlier expansion into the region and the world have effectively locked Japanese 
policymakers into self-serving, highly institutionalised relationships that are actually 
inhibiting needed reforms.73 As far as America is concerned, Japan’s residual economic 
strength, and the consequent reliance successive administrations have placed on 
Japanese institutional investors to buy American government bonds, has fundamentally 
transformed the nature of the inter-dependency between American and Japan. Not only 
does America rely on continuing Japanese investment to underpin its own low-interest 
rate regime and budget deficits, but American economic policy is constrained by, and 
dependent on, the enduring strength of the Japanese economy as a consequence.74 In 
other words, there are major limitations to what America can demand of Japan, for fear 
of compounding Japan’s problems and triggering a long-feared banking crisis.75 
 
Japanese policymakers have thus far been reluctant to exploit their latent power. 
However, despite America’s capacity to use its dominant position to engineer 
favourable economic outcomes,76 the growing economic interdependence between the 
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US and Japan means that neither government can act independently. Moreover, the idea 
that either ‘Japanese’ or ‘American’ power and/or interests can be as readily identified 
as they once were in an increasingly integrated transnational political economy, let 
alone pursued, is becoming increasingly problematic – something that undercuts both 
realist and liberal notions of hegemony.   
 
Yet the US government plainly has been at the forefront of a pro-market, neoliberal 
reformist agenda that has been directed at Japan in particular and which – despite a 
noteworthy lack of enthusiasm on the part of the Japanese government – has had a 
major long-term impact. The gradual liberalisation of Japan’s financial sector has 
slowly, but irrevocably, it seems, helped to undermine both the close ties between 
Japanese corporations and banks,77 and set in train a wider process of what seems to be 
unstoppable social and political change.78 But the point to stress again, however, is that 
such pressures have as much to do with general systemic changes in the wider 
international economy generally, and the rise of financial capital in particular, as they 
do with any coherent ‘American’ interests being brought to bear on ‘Japan’. Put 
differently, in both the US and - to a lesser extent Japan - long-term changes in the 
structure of economic activity have created new centres of power and interest that have 
taken advantage of, and helped to create, a new, increasingly liberal regulatory order.79 
Once more, a complex dialectic of underlying economic change, institutional reform 
and ideational shifts, have brought about a new order which is increasingly 
transnational and de-centred. This is not to say, however, that this has brought about a 
‘convergence’ of US and Japanese practices. On the contrary, the style of capitalism in 
both countries continues to display noteworthy, nationally based differences.80 
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Although there are particular historical factors that account for both Japan’s foreign 
policy making difficulties – not the least of which is the legacy of Japan’s war-time 
activities – and for its continuing subordination to the US, it helps illustrate a wider 
reality: even a nation-state as famously insular and preoccupied with national identity 
as Japan is having its ‘national interest’ re-shaped by powerful, increasingly 
transnational systemic forces. Where ‘Japanese power’ is expressed, it is through its 
latent economic strength, its corporations and even – albeit increasingly negatively – 
through its financial sector. And yet the financial crisis may yet allow Japanese 
policymakers to play a more conventional and prominent international role and even 
‘balance’ American power in the way realists might expect. If they do, however, it is 
likely to be at the regional level, rather than bilaterally. 
 
US Hegemony and Post-Cold War Regionalism in East Asia 
 
One of the more significant developments in an era dominated by processes associated 
with globalisation has been a simultaneous renewal of interest in regionalism, at both a 
theoretical and policy level. The ‘new’ regionalism – or state-led, cooperative political 
projects – is often self-consciously intended to proactively respond to global 
competitive forces.81 Increased regionalisation, on the other hand, while it may be 
encouraged by political initiatives, is primarily a form of private sector, market-driven 
economic integration. In East Asia, regional integration has been predominantly a 
consequence of private sector rather than government activities.82 Indeed, there has 
generally been widespread scepticism about the potential for greater political 
cooperation in East Asia where, partly because of the US’s preference for bilateralism, 
there is little history of successful regional level institutional development.83  And yet, 
recent initiatives within the region suggest that there is a growing desire to 
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institutionalise regional cooperation – an ambition that has actually been galvanised by 
the recent actions of the US. 
 
The defining moment in the recent history of East Asia was the financial crisis that 
unfolded from 1997 onwards. The essential elements of this story are by now well 
enough known to need no repetition here.84 A couple of points merit emphasis, 
however. First, the IMF’s reform agenda for the distressed economies of South Korea 
and Southeast Asia, which went far beyond its usual crisis management blueprint, and 
which was generally considered to have been inappropriate and actually counter-
productive, was widely resented throughout the region.85 The close association between 
the IMF, the US generally, and Wall Street in particular, further heightened the sense 
that American-based financial interests were privileged over the needs of East Asia’s 
masses in the management of the crisis.86 Second, when the US moved to veto Japan’s 
proposed Asian Monetary Fund, (which was designed to bail-out the crisis-affected 
economies, and which might have made the impact of the crisis much less severe), it 
further heightened awareness about the region’s overall vulnerability to both the new 
international economic order, and to the power of the US and the international financial 
institutions (IFIs) over which it exercises such influence.87 
 
One of the principal consequences of US interventionism during the crisis and the 
heightened perception of regional vulnerability and powerlessness it engendered, has 
been a rapid acceleration in regional political cooperation. The most significant 
manifestation of this process is the so-called ASEAN+3 grouping which, in addition to 
the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, includes the much more 
significant economies of South Korea, China and Japan. ASEAN+3 is essentially a re-
badged version of Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir’s East Asian Economic Caucus, 
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an ‘Asians only’ economic grouping that was still-born as a consequence of American 
opposition and Japan’s consequent ambivalence.88 In the new, post-crisis economic and 
political environment, however, not only is American opposition significantly more 
muted, a number of key actors are also showing an increased willingness to take the 
lead in encouraging greater regional integration. Both Japan and China have powerful 
incentives to do so – something that may help them overcome entrenched rivalries and 
resentments. The Chinese government continues to feel that the US has failed to 
adequately acknowledge its pivotal stabilising role during the crisis (China’s 
maintenance of the value of renmenbi provided some crucial stability during the crisis 
and enhanced its regional leadership credentials as a consequence), while Japan 
recognises the potential importance of a regional platform from which to try and shape 
the rules that govern the international system.89 
 
Although at one level this may look like a classic case of power ‘balancing’ of a sort 
realists might predict, it is significant that it is not occurring within a military context. 
On the contrary, the most tangible expression of these new patterns of regional 
cooperation are economic, and reflect both the seismic shifts that have occurred in the 
structure of international production and finance, and a growing awareness of the novel 
character of threats to national and regional security. While greater monetary 
cooperation and the encouragement of intra-regional trade may be unglamorous, the 
initiatives being undertaken in East Asia represent an attempt to carve out greater 
regional economic autonomy that could provide greater insulation from both the US 
and the IFIs that play such a prominent part in transnational governance. Although 
there are still many potential obstacles to the sort of enhanced regionalism ASEAN+3 
seeks to achieve, it is noteworthy that even in East Asia there is a recognition that the 
sort of regional cooperation and pooling of sovereignty that has characterised the 
European Union - which has given Western Europe a concomitantly greater global 
presence as a consequence – may be necessary if East Asia is achieve a political 
presence in keeping with its economic potential. Indeed, it is important to emphases 
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that of all the putative regional economies and monetary orders, East Asia has the most 
formidable savings and monetary reserves with which to attain it.90 
 
What this review of East Asian regionalism suggests, therefore, is that political and 
economic cooperation is being driven by a more complex array of forces than a simple 
reaction to US hegemony. True, the US has played a pivotal role in shaping the 
political-economic arena in which East Asia’s putative regionalism is being played out, 
but it is significant that the emerging ASEAN+3 agenda in particular is being driven by 
systemic issues – especially regulatory policy for the finance sector - rather than simply 
attempting to balance US power in a more conventional sense.  In this regard it is 
important to emphasise that the sort of relationship that governments will have with 
prominent economic forces is not an inevitable functional reflection of the ‘needs’ of 
capital. On the contrary, the precise form any regulatory regime takes will be shaped by 
influences that reflect contingent distributions of power and influence. Given that the 
increasingly discredited and scandal-plagued character of Wall Street has undermined 
the ideational legitimacy of Anglo-American economics and demonstrated that ‘crony 
capitalism’ is not an exclusively East Asian phenomenon,91 it will not be surprising if 
East Asians continue to try and develop alternative ways of organising economic 





As the international system has changed, so has the character of US hegemony. 
Although the US clearly remains the most powerful nation-state the world has ever 
seen, its power is increasingly articulated and constrained in ways that are distinct from 
earlier eras. In addition to the more conventional readings of American power which 
focus on military might and diplomatic manoeuvrings, the US’s impact on its major 
potential rivals in East Asia has also occurred through the auspices of the IFIs and 
wider secular changes in the global political economy. China, as we have seen, is being 
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fundamentally transformed as a consequence of its interaction with the global capitalist 
economy generally, and by the regulatory requirements of a WTO-managed 
international trading system in particular. The possibility of emulating the sort of state-
led development model followed by South Korea and Japan in an earlier era is rendered 
more difficult by an increasingly pervasive market-centred regulatory regime that is 
shaped by both state and non-state actors.  Likewise Japan, although especially 
susceptible to American political pressure for a variety of historical reasons, has been 
powerfully affected by changes that owe as much to the long-run rise of financial 
capital as they do to American power per se. To understand contemporary hegemony, 
therefore, we need to look at the way particular national economic spaces are integrated 
into the international system, the emergence of new transnational governance 
mechanisms, and the way in which national political elites have responded to this. 
 
What the East Asian experience suggests is that such responses are not inevitable or 
necessary reactions to either the ‘logic of capitalism’ or the dynamics of US hegemony. 
It is clear that capitalism was organised very differently in East Asia prior to the crisis; 
it is also apparent that East Asia’s distinctive political practices and economic 
structures are not going to disappear overnight. While the neoliberal-style policy 
regime that America has been closely associated with may have become increasingly 
influential, there are growing doubts about its efficacy on a range of ‘technical’ and 
normative grounds. Such doubts, and additional concerns about the intrusive influence 
of the US and the IFIs in the aftermath of the recent crisis, have accelerated the 
development of regionally based political and economic cooperation. If such initiatives 
continue to develop – and this is plainly a big ‘if’, given the region’s history – then it is 
likely that East Asia will continue to highlight the paradoxes of contemporary 
hegemony: on the one hand, it is difficult to see how Japan and China - absent a major 
war - will directly challenge US hegemony as conventionally understood. On the other 
hand, when the legitimacy of American-style capitalism is less assured, when its 
national economic policy is constrained by sectorally-based conflicts of interest that 
compromise a unified ‘American’ position in keeping with the liberal goals of the IFIs, 
then ‘the US’ itself may be riven by contradictions that make the pursuit of national 
interests for even the most powerful of nation-states surprisingly problematic.  
